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I. INTRODUCTION
Is professional baseball in jeopardy of losing its foundation,
minor league baseball; and in turn depriving generations of
Americans’ of the enjoyment of a sport they’ve come to know and
love? A recent Congressional proposal implies this is imminent. In
the Summer of 2016 Congress introduced the “Save America’s
Pastime Act,” which if passed, would ensure that Minor League
Baseball players do not receive a minimum wage.1 Advocates of this
legislation argue that it would prevent the current minor league
system from falling apart, but these arguments rely heavily on an
unsubstantiated inference that paying minor league athletes a
minimum wage would incentivize the major league parent
organization to cut funding.2 Ultimately, this is just the latest
development in the long history of mistreatment of Minor League
Baseball players, which is due in part to the fact that they are
viewed as apprentices, and not full-time employees.3
This comment begins with a brief explanation of the
relationship between Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and Minor
League Baseball (“MiLB”). Then, it provides an overview of the
history of MLB and MiLB legislation and case law. Specifically, it
addresses MLB’s treatment under antitrust laws, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Curt Flood Act (“CFA”). Next, it
discusses the current status of the typical MiLB athlete. As a final
1. See Save America’s Pastime Act, H.R. 5580, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016)
(proposing that minor league baseball players are not entitled to the protections
of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
2. See Joseph Nocco, MLB Issues Statement Regarding “Save America’s
Pastime Act”, www.todaysknuckleball.com/news/mlb-issues-statementregarding-save-americas-pastime-act (last visited: Oct. 5, 2016) (posting
MLB’s statement in support of the Act due to alleged inability to afford
funding MiLB if MiLB players’ wages are raised); But see Rob Garver, The
‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ in Congress is Trying to Justify Low Pay for Some
Baseball Players, www.businessinsider.com/the-save-americas-pastime-act-incongress-is-trying-to-boost-pay-for-some-baseball-players-2016-7 (last visited:
Oct. 5, 2016) (arguing that MLB’s argument in support of the ‘Save the
Pastime Act’ is disingenuous because MiLB owners can easily afford to
withstand a raise in salaries).
3. See Jeff Passan, How Minor League Baseball Left Its Players in Poverty
and Tried to Save Itself Instead, sports.yahoo.com/news/how-minor-leaguebaseball-left-its-players-in-poverty-and-tried-to-save-itself-instead185300079.html, (last visited: Oct. 7, 2016) (quoting MiLB’s president
describing MiLB players as trainees, or participating in an extended
internship).
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matter of background, this comment reviews recent developments
pertaining to MiLB players, including the pending Senne lawsuit
and the “Save America’s Pastime Act.”4 Finally, these developments
are considered collectively in order to assess whether they will
influence change in regard to MiLB players’ wage status.
Furthermore, this comment analyzes whether it is practicable for
Congress to reverse course and take action to protect MiLB athletes.
This comment concludes with a proposal that Congress borrows
from legislation which protects MLB players from antitrust laws in
legislation in order to draft legislation which would protect MiLB
players from being paid below the federal minimum wage.

II. BACKGROUND
Prior to analyzing MiLB players’ circumstances and proposing
any sort of solution, one must understand the long history of MLB’s
treatment in the legal world. Accordingly, this comment first
explains the basic structure of MLB and its MiLB affiliate
organizations. Next, it discusses MLB’s legal position in relation to
relevant federal law, including its favorable antitrust exemption,
the subsequent drafting of the Curt Flood Act, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Finally, this section explains the latest
developments in legal issues pertaining to MLB and MiLB, namely
the recently proposed ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ and a pending
class action suit against MLB.

A. Brief Explanation of the Relationship Between MLB
and MiLB
MLB consists of 30 organizations and each organization either
owns or is affiliated with up to five MiLB organizations where
players improve their skills in order to reach the MLB
organization.5 The MiLB system consists of up to five leagues:
Rookie Ball, Single A (often split between Low A and High A),
Double A, and Triple A.6 Players do not take the same path through
the MiLB system.7 Generally, players rise through the minor league
4. Complaint, Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14CV00608,
2014
WL
545501
(N.D.
Cal.
Feb.
7,
2014),
available
at
www.scribd.com/document/224796744/Senne-v-MLB-2d-Amended-Complaint
(hereinafter Senne Complaint); See also 114 H.R. 5580 § 2 (proposing new
legislation to guarantee MiLB players are not entitled to FLSA protections).
5. The Sports Advisory Group, Overview of Baseball’s Minor League
Organization, www.thesportsadvisorygroup.com/resource-library/business-ofsports/overview-of-baseballs-minor-league-organization/ (last visited: Dec. 10,
2016).
6. Id.
7. See Michael K. Hobbs, Lifting the Antitrust Exemption Presents a Major
Problem for Minor League Baseball, 84 UMKC L. REV. 1059, 1079 (2016)
(discussing a case example of a talented MiLB player, Kris Bryant, who was
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system one level at a time; however, more talented players skip
levels and graduate faster to the MLB. However, a majority of
players never reach MLB.8
MLB currently provides all funding for MiLB functions: the
coaches, umpires, equipment, and essentially all overhead costs
that allow MiLB to operate.9 MiLB players’ salaries are included in
this funding provided by MLB.10
However, MiLB salaries are remarkably low when taking into
account the amount of hours, days, and years put into their job.11 It
is in MLB’s best interest to keep these wages as low as possible, and
their legal position allows them to do so successfully.12 However, the
low wages of MiLB players have been challenged recently through
a class action suit, which will be discussed in further detail in the
analysis section of this comment.13

III. HISTORY OF LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW PERTAINING
TO MLB AND MILB
Federal antitrust laws protect consumers by prohibiting
business practices which inhibit a free and competitive
marketplace.14 Congress’s primary enforcement of these protections
is done through the Sherman Act (“the Act”) and the Clayton Act.15
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 to outlaw any “restraint
in trade,” or “attempted monopolization.”16 However, the courts
determined that the Act only outlawed unreasonable restraints on
trade, which resulted in corporations exploiting loopholes to
circumvent the Act, while continuing to form monopolies.17 For

capable of reaching MLB sooner than most MiLB players).
8. Id.
9. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1070.
10. Id.
11. See Garver, supra note 2 (quoting Garrett Broshuis, a former MiLB
player and current lawyer, describing MiLB player’s working 10 hour workdays
seven days a week).
12. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1070.
13. See generally Senne Complaint, supra note 4 (alleging MLB
organizations are violating FLSA wage requirements by failing to pay them a
minimum wage).
14. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, The Antitrust Laws, www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
(describing
the development of federal antitrust laws; from the Sherman Act (outlawing
corporations involved in interstate commerce from taking action which results
in unreasonable restraints in trade), to the Clayton Act (designed to strengthen
the enforcement of the Sherman Act against corporations involved in interstate
commerce)).
15. See id. (explaining that the Clayton Act was enacted due to a belief the
Sherman Antitrust Act by itself was ineffective at prohibiting monopolies, and
the Act in general contained many loopholes).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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example, two companies may form a partnership constituting a
restraint in trade, but if the restraint could not be shown to be
unreasonable, the Court had no power to strike it.18 Therefore, the
Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to strengthen the Sherman Act.
The Clayton Act prevents corporations from performing mergers if
such a merger results in substantially lessened competition or tends
to create a monopoly.19 MLB and the federal antitrust laws first
converged in 1922.
MLB purchased a number of teams from the Federal Baseball
League after the Federal League began to disband in 1922, arguably
leading to MLB’s monopolization of professional baseball.20 The
Federal Baseball League challenged MLB’s purchase as a violation
of antitrust laws, and the result was the seminal case in MLB’s
treatment under antitrust laws, Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.21
In Federal, The Federal Baseball League argued that MLB’s
purchase constituted an anticompetitive monopoly, and therefore
violated federal antitrust law.22 However, Congress enforces the
antitrust laws through their Commerce Clause authority.23 Thus,
the determinative question for the Supreme Court was whether or
not the business of MLB was involved in interstate commerce.24 The
Court held that MLB’s business consisted of holding baseball games
within the state, and were thus wholly state affairs not a part of
interstate commerce.25 The Court held this way even though it
acknowledged that professional baseball games induce the other
team, and often times many fans, to cross state lines to attend the
games.26 According to Justice Holmes, these occurrences of
individuals crossing state lines are not enough to change the
essential character of the business.27 Thus, as a result of Federal,
MLB was exempt from federal antitrust laws because MLB is not
involved in interstate commerce.28
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Shauna Teresa DiGiovanni, Underpaid, Unrepresented, Unprotected: A
Call for Change in the Status Quo of Minor League Baseball, 22 SPORTS LAW. J.
243, 245 (2015).
21. Id.
22. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
23. See The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016) (requiring the
questioned action be a “restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states,” to be illegal).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 8 (Congress has the power to “regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states); See also Hobbs,
supra note 7, at 1061 (2016) (discussing the Court’s decision in Federal being
based on whether or not MLB participated in interstate commerce).
25. Federal, 259 U.S. at 208.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 209.
28. See id. (affirming the Court of Appeals holding that Major League
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The first challenge to MLB’s antitrust exemption came in 1953,
in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.29 In Toolson, the plaintiff was
an MLB player under contract with the Newark International
Baseball Club who assigned his contract to another team.30 He
refused to report to the team Newark assigned his contract to, was
subsequently placed on an ineligible list, and was not allowed to
participate in professional baseball up until the time of the suit.31
The plaintiff appealed his case up to the Supreme Court, which
declined to alter MLB’s antitrust exemption.32 In a per curiam
opinion, the Court explained that the business of professional
business had been left exempt from antitrust laws for 30 years, and
any change to such exemption would need to come from
congressional action.33 Thus, the Court deferred to Congress and
reasoned that Congress’s inaction indicated MLB’s antitrust
exemption was proper.34
Noteworthy however, are comments made in the dissenting
opinion written by Justice Burton, arguing against the rationale of
Justice Holmes in Federal.35 Justice Burton commented on the
expansion of the business of baseball, its larger audiences,
television and radio networks and purchases in interstate
commerce.36 Burton’s dissenting opinion further states that it would
be contradictory to say the business of baseball is not involved in
interstate commerce, which would bring MLB within the scope of
federal antitrust laws.37 Justice Burton’s dissent is the first
commentary from the Court that acknowledged that professional
baseball is treated as an anomaly in antitrust jurisprudence.38
The next challenge to MLB’s antitrust exemption was Flood v.
Kuhn; when former MLB player Curt Flood filed suit after his
contract was assigned to another team and he declined to report.39
Prior to filing suit, Flood requested to be a free agent to give him a
choice of what team to sign a contract with, but the league denied
his request.40 The Court agreed with Justice Burton’s dissenting
opinion that professional baseball is engaged in interstate
commerce due to its growth since Federal was decided. However,
Baseball was not within the purview of federal antitrust laws).
29. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1067 (discussing the history of case law
pertaining to MLB’s antitrust exemption, including the results of Toolson).
30. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
31. Id.
32. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
33. Id.
34. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
35. See id. (Burton, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is illogical to describe
MLB as a business not involved in interstate commerce due to MLB’s increase
in the size and reach to consumers).
36. Id. (Burton, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 358. (Burton J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972).
40. Id.
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the Court still upheld MLB’s exemption from antitrust laws.41 The
Court admitted that MLB’s exemption was an anomaly, since other
sports were not given such treatment.42 However, the Court
ultimately left it to Congress’s discretion to change the law.43
Congress responded 26 years later by enacting the Curt Flood Act.44

A. The Curt Flood Act
The Curt Flood Act (“CFA”) stands alone as the only legislation
passed by Congress altering MLB’s exemption from antitrust
laws.45 The CFA states that its purpose is to declare that MLB
players are protected under federal antitrust laws.46 A strict
adherence to the Act’s purpose gives rise to the inference that only
major league baseball players are covered under the CFA.47 Yet,
supporters of higher wages for MiLB players advocate for a broad
interpretation of the Act which would bring MiLB players within
the scope of the CFA.48
1. Express Language of the CFA
Congress declared in section two of the CFA that the
legislation’s purpose is to declare that MLB players are protected
by antitrust law, insofar as MLB players now have the same rights
as do other professional athletes.49 In other words, MLB players
now have standing to sue an organization that violates the Sherman
or Clayton Act.50 Pursuant to the CFA; the conduct, acts, and
practices of MLB affecting the employment of its athletes at the
major league level are subject to antitrust laws to the same extent
as if it was any other sports business affecting interstate
commerce.51 The final section of the CFA consists of qualifications
of individuals who are covered by the statute, as well as defining a
41. Id. at 282.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1067 (describing the history of MLB’s
antitrust exemption, and the factors that contributed to the passage of the Curt
Flood Act; including the Flood Court’s deference to Congress and MLBPA
lobbying to Congress for the CFA).
45. Id.
46. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297 § 2, 105 Enacted S. 53 (1998)
[hereinafter The Curt Flood Act].
47. The Curt Flood Act § 2.
48. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068-70 (analyzing how the language of the
CFA, “…directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball
players…” lends itself to an argument for a broad interpretation of the Act).
49. The Curt Flood Act § 2.
50. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068.
51. See The Curt Flood Act § 3(a) (specifying that the conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements of persons in the business of MLB are subject to
antitrust laws).
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“major league baseball player” for the purposes of the CFA.52 Each
of the four qualifications require a claimant to have been a party to
a major league player’s contract.53 Therefore, none of these
definitions encompass players in MiLB.54
2. The CFA’s Impact on MiLB Players
The passage of the CFA has done nothing to extend its
protections to MiLB players, since it has only been applied to
employment of those in MLB.55 As such, a MiLB player cannot
challenge an organization’s decision to alter their contract in any
way, but an MLB player can challenge such a decision if it violates
antitrust laws.56 This development, however, has not detracted
supporters of higher wages for MiLB athletes from advocating for a
broad interpretation of the CFA in order to include MiLB players.57
a. Arguments for a broad interpretation
Those who support the belief that the CFA should encompass
MiLB players rely on the language of the statute itself.58 The
relevant language states, “the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements of persons in the business of organized professional
major league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league
level are subject to the antitrust laws…”59. Those in favor of a broad
interpretation of the CFA argue that the agreements MiLB players
sign when they begin their careers ultimately has a direct effect on
the employment of MLB players and the agreements are entitled to
antitrust protection.60 Thus, this interpretation would bring MiLB
players into the scope of the CFA and entitle them to its protections.

52. See The Curt Flood Act § 3(c) (specifying that a MLB player is either: 1)
a person who is a party to a major league player’s contract or playing at the
MLB level; 2) a person who was a party to a major league player’s contract or
playing baseball at the MLB level at the time of the injury that is the subject of
the complaint; 3) a person who has been a party to a MLB’ player contract who
claims he has been injured in efforts to secure subsequent major league level
contracts, but not minor league level contracts; 4) a person who was a party to
a major league player’s contract or who was playing baseball in the season prior
to the expiration of the last CBA).
53. The Curt Flood Act § 3(c).
54. The Curt Flood Act § 3(c).
55. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1069 (detailing that there is a current debate
that the CFA should be interpreted broadly); See also The Curt Flood Act § 2
(declaring the purpose of the Act is to make only those in MLB protected by
antitrust laws).
56. The Curt Flood Act § 3(c).
57. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1069.
58. Id.
59. The Curt Flood Act § 3(a)
60. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1069.
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b. Arguments for a narrow interpretation
On the other side, the arguments for an interpretation of the
CFA which only encompasses players in MLB are also based on a
textual interpretation of the CFA.61 In addition to the purpose of the
Act, the CFA precludes those baseball players in the minor league
level, or at an amateur level from having standing to sue under the
CFA.62 Moreover, Congress included, as a prerequisite to any of the
categories of qualified individuals, the existence of a major league
player’s contract either at the time of the lawsuit or in the past.63
Both the stated purpose of giving MLB players antitrust
protections, and the stringent standing requirements of the CFA
have made it nearly impossible for MiLB players to seek refuge
using the CFA. Accordingly, MiLB players have begun to turn to a
different recourse, mainly the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).64

B. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA was enacted in 1938, with the goal of protecting the
general welfare of vulnerable employees, i.e. requiring they be paid
fair wages for their labor.65 A key provision of the FLSA is a
guarantee that workers are paid at a level that is not below the
federally set minimum.66 However, numerous exemptions from this
provision are also available within the FLSA.67 The pertinent
exemptions to MiLB’s wage status are the “bona fide professional”
and the “seasonal employee” exemptions.68
1. The FLSA Minimum Wage Mandate and Relevant
Exceptions
Section 206 of the FLSA requires that employers pay their
employees at least the federal minimum wage if their employees are
engaged in commerce, or if they are employed in an enterprise

61. Id.
62. The Curt Flood Act § 3(b)(1).
63. The Curt Flood Act § 3(c).
64. See generally Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1062 (explaining that there are
current lawsuits challenging the application of the CFA strictly to MLB players,
implicitly recognizing that a narrow interpretation is currently used).
65. Lucas J. Carney, Major League Baseball’s “Foul Ball”: Why Minor
League Baseball Players Are Not Exempt Employees Under The Fair Labor
Standards Act, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 283, 292 (2015).
66. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (mandating that
employees engaged in commerce shall pay its employees a minimum wage equal
to at least the federal level).
67. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2012) (providing a list of employees who
are exempt from the mandates of the FLSA).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), (3).
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engaged in commerce.69 However, Section 213 of the FLSA consists
of an extensive list of categories of employees that are exempt from
the minimum wage requirements.70 Two of these exemptions are
relevant concerning MLB and MiLB relations: the “bona fide
professional” and “seasonal employee” exemptions.71 Commenters
have explained that if MLB is forced to defend FLSA violations,
these two exemptions would be their strongest arguments.72
a. The bona fide professional exemption
The FLSA defines a “bona fide professional” as someone
employed in a bona fide “executive, administrative, or professional
capacity”.73 The Department of Labor breaks this section down to
two types of professionals: learned and creative.74 A learned
professional is someone with advanced knowledge and is employed
in a field of science or learning.75 If MiLB athletes do fall under this
exemption, they would be in the “creative professional” category.76
An employee qualifies for the creative professional exemption
if they satisfy three requirements.77 The employee must: 1) be paid
on a salary basis, 2) be paid at a rate greater than $455 per week,
and 3) the employee’s primary duty is performance of work that
requires originality or talent in a recognized field of artistic or
creative endeavor.78
The creative professional exemption is based on a policy that
the individuals are compensated adequately with high base pay and

69. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (stating the federal minimum wage at $7.25
per hour).
70. See generally § 213(a)(1) - (13) (exempting various employees from FLSA
protection. For example: publishers of newspapers with circulations of less than
four thousand; particular agricultural employees, babysitters or other domestic
service workers, inter alia);
71. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), (a)(3); See also Carney, supra note 64, at 293-94
(explaining the FLSA exemptions that will likely be argued by MLB).
72. Carney, supra note 65, at 293-94.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see also Department of Labor: Wage and Hour
Division (2008), www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/fs17d_professional.pdf [hereinafter
Department of Labor] (explaining to qualify for the 213(a)(1) exemption the
employee must be paid on a salary basis and have a primary duties relating to
either executive, administrative, or professional duties).
74. See Carney, supra note 65, at 296 (citing to Department of Labor
guidelines to explain how to determine whether an individual is a “creative
professional”); see also Department of Labor, supra note 72 (explaining that a
learned professional and creative professional are both judged on the same
salary test, but the duties test differ. They each require the primary duty of the
employee to be in a field of science and learning, and in a recognized field of
artistic or creative endeavor, respectively).
75. Department of Labor, supra note 73.
76. Carney, supra note 65, at 297.
77. See Department of Labor, supra note 73 (promulgating guidelines on
how to classify individuals as a creative professional as defined by the FLSA).
78. Id.
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do not need as much protection as “blue-collar” workers; that is to
say the value these employees provide is generally not based on the
hours they work.79 Moreover, it is argued that the value of these
employees cannot be quantified by hourly pay.80 Whether the
exemption is applicable is determined on a case-by-case basis.81 For
example, actors, musicians, and authors frequently satisfy the
requirements for the “bona fide creative professional” exemption.82
However, while it is debatable whether MiLB players satisfy the
requirements of this exemption, there is no relevant case law
pertaining to MLB using the creative professional exemption.
b. The seasonal employee exemption
An employee is also exempt from the FLSA minimum wage
requirements if he or she is a seasonal employee.83 The FLSA
defines a seasonal employee as someone employed by an
amusement or recreational establishment which operates less than
seven months of the year, or if its average receipts for any six
months of the year are not more than one-third of its average
receipts for the rest of the year.84 The courts have recognized MLB’s
entitlement to the seasonal employee exemption in some cases, but
have also rejected their argument for the exemption on other
occasions.85
2. Relevant Case Law for the Seasonal Employee Exemption
In Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, the court held that the
Cincinnati Reds, an MLB organization, may not seek refuge for
FLSA violations by using the seasonal occupation exemption.86 The
Reds maintenance workers sued the organization for failure to pay
overtime wages, but the team argued it was exempt from doing so
because they operate for less than seven months of the year.87 The
79. Carney, supra note 65, at 296.
80. Id.
81. See Department of Labor, supra note 73 (describing the salary and duties
tests used to determine if someone is a creative professional which will be
discussed in further depth later in the comment).
82. Id.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3).
84. Id.; See also Carney, supra note 65, at 301 (describing in the abstract
that an employer must satisfy either duration of operation test (less than 7
months out of the year), or the average receipts test to receive a seasonal
employee exemption).
85. See Carney, supra note 65, at 301-6 (analyzing the three seminal cases—
Bridewell, Adams, and Jeffery—challenging MLB’s entitlement to a seasonal
employee exemption).
86. See Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1998)
(affirming the district court’s decision that the organization failed to satisfy both
the durational and receipts test to qualify for the seasonal employee exemption).
87. See Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1995)
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Reds were initially granted the exemption under the less than seven
months of operation test on summary judgment, but that was
reversed due to the fact that the Reds employed 120 year-round
employees.88 The Reds alternative argument that it satisfied the
average receipts test was rejected as well, because their accounting
method was improper.89
However, in Adams v. Detroit Tigers, the Detroit Tigers
established their entitlement to a seasonal occupation exemption by
satisfying the average receipts test.90 The court in Adams agreed
with the Bridewell court that MLB organizations operate yearround, and that it is improper to analyze a FLSA section
213(a)(3)(A) claim based only on when the team hosts games.91 The
court thus ruled that the Tigers were a year-round operation just
like the Reds in Bridewell.92 However, unlike the Reds, the Tigers
were able to satisfy the receipts test in Section 213(a)(3)(B), and
were entitled to an exemption from the FLSA.93 The diverging
conclusions are based on the different accounting methods used by
the organizations.94
In slightly different circumstances in Jeffery v. Sarasota White
Sox, the court held that an MiLB organization is entitled to a
seasonal occupation exemption because they operate less than
seven months of the year.95 In Jeffery, a MiLB organization’s
groundskeeper sued, alleging the organization was not in
compliance with the FLSA.96 Contrary to the cases described above,

(reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
organization because the team does not operate for less than seven months in a
given year. The court remanded for determination of whether the Reds satisfied
the receipts test).
88. Id.; See also Carney, supra note 64, at 301-2 (analyzing the procedural
posture of Bridewell).
89. See Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 832 (holding the Reds reporting their receipts
as income is not the proper accounting method to grant it entitlement to the
FLSA exemption as instructed by FLSA § 213(a)(3)(B)).
90. Adams v. Detroit Tigers, 961 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E. D. Mich. 1997); See
also Carney, supra note 64, at 305 (analyzing the reasoning of the district court
granting the Tigers an exemption under § 213(a)(3)(B), that an organization’s
accountant’s undisputed figures were sufficient to show that their average
receipts for six months of the year did not exceed one-third of its average
receipts for the rest of the year).
91. Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180; 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(B).
92. Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180.
93. Id.; See also Carney, supra note 65, at 306 (explaining the differences
between Bridewell and Adams, whereas the Reds accounting method precluded
it from a Section 213(a)(3)(B) exemption but the Tigers accounting was
sufficient).
94. Id.
95. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 596 (11th Cir. 1995); See also
Carney, supra note 64, at 303 (describing generally the 11th Circuit’s decision
to diverge from Bridewell and Adams and grant Sarasota a seasonal employee
exemption under section 213(a)(3)(A)).
96. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593.
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the court ruled that team’s operation was less than seven months,
and the fact that the plaintiff continued to work in the offseason did
not change their exempt status.97 One difference in Jeffery
compared to the other discussed court decisions is that a minor
league organization was sued directly in Jeffery.98
A pending lawsuit, Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball,
challenges MLB’s entitlement to FLSA exemptions.99

C. Current Status of MiLB Players
MLB’s longstanding antitrust exemption, the CFA, and FLSA
exemptions collectively allow MLB to legally pay MiLB athletes
below the federally mandated minimum wage.100 Monthly wages for
MiLB players typically range between $1,100 to $3,000 depending
on the particular player’s experience.101 While the CFA increased
MLB’s players ability to negotiate a fair contract, MiLB players are
still subject to a version of the reserve clause system.102 This
remnant of the reserve clause system grants the MLB parent
organization the ability to unilaterally extend or decline a player’s
contract until the player reaches at least six years of MLB service
time (i.e. experience).103
Some argue that the benefits from MLB’s favorable legal
position outweigh the negatives.104 A common argument supporting
MLB’s current system is that MLB is better able to fund their MiLB

97. Id. at 596; See also Carney, supra note 65, at 301-6 (discussing the
contradictions in past decisions regarding MLB’s entitlement to the seasonal
employee exemption of the FLSA and arguing they are reconcilable because
they were decided on different grounds).
98. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596.
99. See generally Senne Complaint, supra note 4 (describing the allegations
made by the MiLB plaintiffs against MLB, including FLSA minimum wage and
overtime violations); See also Carney, supra note 65, at 306 (analyzing the
FLSA violations alleged by the Senne plaintiffs, and applying the likely
defenses used by MLB).
100. See Jeff Blank, Minor League Salary, www.sportslawblogger.com/
baseball/salary-information/minor-league-salary (last visited: Oct. 5, 2016)
(providing information on the monthly salaries of minor league players); But see
Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1070-77 (describing the benefits of the antitrust
exemption for MiLB teams, players, and the local communities because MLB is
able to fund MiLB organizations arguably because of the antitrust exemption).
101. See Blank, supra note 100 (explaining how the monthly salaries of
MiLB players differ depending on how many years they have played).
102. See generally Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1067 (explaining the CFA’s effect
of ending the reserve clause system limiting MLB team’s control on players
contracts); See also FANGRAPHS, Service Time, www.fangraphs.com/library/
principles/contract-details/service-time-super-two (last visited: Oct. 6, 2016)
(describing the MLB’s service time system; the MLB organization has the
ability to unilaterally extend or decline a player’s contract until the player
accrues at least six years of professional experience).
103. FANGRAPHS, supra note 102.
104. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1070-72.
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organizations for equipment, sign more players, and therefore
provide more individuals an opportunity to make the Major
Leagues.105
The underlying premise to this argument in favor of MLB is
that providing a fair wage structure to MiLB athletes will
incentivize MLB organizations to limit the size of their rosters.106
MLB argues they would be forced to allocate expenses differently
due to the rise in salaries, and in turn claim this will lead to smaller
rosters.107 However, those in favor of increased wages for MiLB
players argue MiLB’s rosters would not need to be limited because
of MLB’s ability to absorb the wage increase, and that MLB’s claims
are overstated.108

D. The Senne Lawsuit
In Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, a collective group
of minor leaguers have filed a class action lawsuit against MLB and
the Commissioner of baseball.109 The complaint cites FLSA
violations against the MLB for failure to pay minimum wage and
overtime pay.110 This lawsuit will have a major implication on the
wages of MiLB players if the court was to rule in favor of the minor
league players.111 A ruling against MLB would essentially remove
the FLSA exemptions as a source of defense for MLB.112
105. Id.; But see Mark Stanton,“Juuuussst A Bit Outside”: A Look at Whether
MLB Owners Can Justify Paying Minor Leaguers Below Minimum Wage
Without Violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 22 JEFFERY S. MOORAD
SPORTS LAW JOURNAL 727, 740 (2015) (analyzing the current relationship
between MLB and MiLB organizations, insofar as the fact that the MLB
organization pays coach and player salaries while MiLB organizations pay for
the business aspects of running a business. Also commenting on the large
figures in revenue both organizations receive every year).
106. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1070-72.
107. See generally Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1070-72 (arguing that MLB would
not be able to withstand the increase in operating costs of MiLB if they were
forced to pay higher wages); But see Garver, supra note 2 (arguing MLB owners
would not be substantially impacted economically by requiring MiLB players
are paid at least a minimum wage).
108. See Ted Berg, The ‘Save America’s Pastime Act in Congress Will Do
Nothing of the Sort, ftw.usatoday.com/2016/06/save-americas-pastime-actminor-league-minimum-wage-lawsuit-mlb-salaries (last visited: Oct. 5, 2016)
(arguing that MLB’s claims are alarmist and that MLB is not in any true danger
of suffering from requiring a federal minimum wage); See also Stanton, supra
note 104, at 740 (explaining that MiLB teams are independently owned with a
net worth of millions of dollars).
109. Senne Complaint, supra note 4; See also Stanton, supra note 104, at
746 (describing the procedural background of the Senne lawsuit).
110. See Stanton, supra note 105, at 747-48 (describing of the factual
background of Senne).
111. See Id. at 751 (analyzing the possible outcomes and implications of the
Senne lawsuit depending on how the Court views the FLSA claims, specifically,
how a victory by MiLB would require MLB to comply with the FLSA).
112. Id.
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The plaintiffs in Senne were initially dealt a blow in July 2016
when a judge decertified the class action holding that the plaintiffs
were not fit to bring a class action.113 The decertification order
stated that individualized issues would arise in connection with the
plaintiffs argument that they’re FLSA rights were violated, and
that a class action was not appropriate.114 However, the Senne
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and were re-certified in
March 2017.115 The class was re-certified once they limited the class
of players to the California league.116 The deciding judge said this
“significantly reduced the variations” within the plaintiffs, which
were his main concerns when he initially decertified the class in
2016.117
Additionally, the Senne plaintiffs face adversity due to recent
developments in federal law. In March 2018 President Trump
signed the 2018 Federal Omnibus Bill (“Bill”) which allocates the
government spending for the fiscal year. Due to lobbying on behalf
of MLB, a version of the Save America’s Pastime Act was worked
into the Bill.118 According to the Bill, MiLB players under contract
that pays them minimum wage are exempt from the FLSA’s
overtime rules.119 The Bill also only requires teams to pay MiLB
during the regular season, and not during spring training or during
the offseason. Ultimately, the Bill guarantees a small raise of
minimum payment to MiLB players to $1,160 a month, compared
to the current $1,100 minimum, but still bars overtime pay despite
the long hours MiLB players often work.120 As of the writing of this
comment, it is not clear how the Bill’s passage will affect the Senne
lawsuit.
It is unclear how the court will rule on the FLSA violations
alleged by the MiLB plaintiffs if the case does go to trial.121 This
comment will assume arguendo that the class will remain certified,
and that the Bill does not render the case moot. The lack of clarity
in the case law when it comes to MLB’s entitlement to the “seasonal
occupation” exemption discussed above makes it difficult to predict
113. Zach Spedden, Plaintiffs Granted Appeal in MiLB Wages Lawsuit,
ballparkdigest.com/2016/09/07/plaintiffs-granted-appeal-in-milb-wageslawsuit/ (last visited: Dec. 20, 2016).
114. Id.
115. Zachary Zagger, Judge Breathes New Life Into Minor Leaguers’ Wage
Suit, LAW360 (April 3, 2017, 6:49 PM), www.law360.com/articles/908546/judgebreathes-new-life-into-minor-leaguers-wage-suit.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Debonis, Warner & O’Keefe, Here’s what Congress is Stuffing Into its
$1.3 Trillion Spending Bill, Debonis, Warner, and O’Keefe, (March 22, 2018)
www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/03/22/heres-whatcongress-is-stuffing-into-its-1-3-trillion-spending-bill/?noredirect=on&
utm_term=.7c0bac5a08e5 (last visited: Mar. 22, 2018).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Stanton, supra note 105, at 749.
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whether the MiLB plaintiffs will be successful.122

E. The Save America’s Pastime Act
Congress proposed the “Save the Pastime Act” in the Summer
of 2016, seemingly in response to concerns over the Senne
lawsuit.123 The Act adds to the exemptions of the FLSA by including
any person who has signed a contract to play baseball at the minor
league level.124 However, minor league baseball players staunchly
oppose the bill’s purpose of excluding MiLB players from protection
of the FLSA.125 The public outcry led to Cheri Bustos, one of the
original sponsors of the bill to withdraw her support for the bill.126
It remains to be seen how the bill will progress through Congress,
or if it will even become law, but it is still an important development
in the federal government’s treatment of MiLB players.127

IV. ANALYSIS
This section will first analyze why the ‘Save the Pastime Act’
is an ineffective and misguided attempt at preserving MiLB. Next,
this section discusses how the history of MLB and MiLB relations,
specifically the FLSA exemptions and CFA will likely impact the

122. Compare Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 139 (ruling a MLB organization does not
operate for only seven months of the year) and Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 832 (ruling
an MLB organization did not satisfy the average receipts test to qualify for the
seasonal employee exemption) with Jeffery, 64 F.3d 590, 596 (holding that a
MiLB organization was entitled to the seasonal employee exemption, and their
entitlement was not affected by the presence of year-round employees).
123. See H.R. 5580 § 2 (proposing that MiLB players are explicitly exempt
from FLSA protections, which would render the plaintiffs’ claims in Senne
moot).
124. H.R. 5580 § 2.
125. See Ryan Fagan, Sponsor of ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ Withdraws
Support for Bill One Day Later, www.sportingnews.com/mlb/news/minorleague-save-americas-pastime-act-salaries-antitrust-rep-cheri-bustoscongress-support/9drbor8m7wj81v49166y7ztqv (last visited: Oct. 9, 2016)
(quoting a minor league player who voiced his concern about the Act, claiming
the popular view of the Act was unfavorable); See also Garver, supra note 2
(describing the working conditions of minor league players, and how a former
minor leaguer criticizing the Act as “outrageous,” and “despicable”).
126. See Fagan, supra note 125 (describing the development of Cheri Bustos
withdrawing her support of the Act after receiving public criticism).
127. See H.R. 5580 (showing the progress of the bill as having been
introduced); See also Jordin Kobritz, Column: Lobbying Congress in Save
America’s Pastime Act, www.dcourier.com/news/2016/jul/12/column-lobbyingcongress-save-americas-pastime-act (last visited: Oct. 5, 2016) (analysis of why
Save America’s Pastime Act is good policy and consistent with current laws);
But see Ted Berg, supra note 108 (quoting a former minor league player
explaining the strong dislike of the proposed legislation, arguing that the policy
suggestions behind the Act are fallacious).
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Senne lawsuit.128 Specifically, this comment addresses the MLB’s
chances of getting the case dismissed, since doing so would leave
MiLB player’s wages at the status quo.129 Also, this comment
examines the differing opinions on how the CFA should be
interpreted and the implications of these interpretations.130 Finally,
this comment discusses if it is practicable for MiLB to lobby to
Congress to model legislation after the CFA to protect MiLB
players.131

A. Why the Arguments for the Save the Pastime Act Are
Misguided
The fallacious argument in support of the ‘Save the Pastime
Act’ is based on economic sustainability.132 MLB’s central argument
in support of the ‘Save the Pastime Act’ is that the Act would
prevent player-development costs from skyrocketing, and as a
direct consequence lead to a significant decrease in the number of
individuals in MiLB.133 Currently, MLB pays the salaries of MiLB
players as well as the operating costs of MiLB organizations.134 The
argument follows that requiring MLB to pay MiLB players a
minimum wage would drastically increase their costs (estimated at
anywhere from $3 to $25 million), and incentivize the league to limit
the number of players on MiLB rosters.135 The flaws in this
argument are outlined below.
The claims that MLB either cannot afford to pay increased
wages, or that it would decrease the numbers of players in MiLB
are exaggerated. MLB has steadily achieved increased revenues,
allotting them sufficient funds to fairly compensate MiLB
players.136 For example, in 2014 MLB grossed $9 billion, which was
128. 29 U.S.C. § 213; See also Carney, supra note 65, at 297-302 (applying
the FLSA exemptions to MLB’s case).
129. See generally Carney, supra note 65, at 307 (discussing the possibility
of an MiLB victory in Senne stripping away MLB’s ability to invoke an
exemption from the FLSA, as well as a settlement provoking labor negotiations
between MLB and MiLB players).
130. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068-70 (providing a further explanation of
the differing opinions of how the CFA should be interpreted).
131. See generally Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1966-67 (discussing the events
leading to the passage of the CFA).
132. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1071.
133. Nocco, supra note 2; See also Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1071 (advocating
that the CFA directly causes cost-savings for MiLB because MLB is able to
afford to fund the operating costs of MiLB).
134. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1071.
135. Id.
136. See Maury Brown, www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/12/04/mlbsees-record-revenues-for-2015-up-500-million-and-approaching-9-5-billion/
#3478dd842307, FORBES (last visited: Nov. 12, 2016) (providing statistics on
MLB’s revenues showing an increase for the 13th consecutive year, including a
$500 million increase for 2015).
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an increase of 13% from the prior year.137 In 2015, MLB’s revenues
once again increased, this time to $9.5 billion.138 Considering the
above numbers, if MLB were to allocate $25 million to MiLB
players, it would still obtain a $475 million net increase in profit.
To break it down further, the average MLB organization is now
worth $1.3 billion, an incredible 59% increase from 2014.139 A key
factor leading to these increased revenues is that many
organizations have acquired regional broadcast deals.140
The figures described above rebut the argument that MLB
cannot afford to both pay increased wages and maintain the current
MiLB system.141 MLB has shown a pattern of increased revenues,
and even assuming the increased cost to MLB to pay MiLB players
a minimum wage is the generous $25 million per year that one
commentator has predicted, it would be affordable for MLB.142

B. Potential outcomes of the Senne Lawsuit
As mentioned above, a MiLB victory in Senne would make it
impossible for MLB to justify MiLB players’ lower wages through
the FLSA exemptions.143 On the other hand, a victory for MLB
would further solidify the precedential value of the Adams decision,
as well as MLB’s general position that MiLB players are not entitled
to a minimum wage.144 MLB is likely to seek dismissal of the Senne
lawsuit by invoking either the creative professional or seasonal
employee exemption.145 It is important, therefore, to understand the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Forbes Releases 19th Annual MLB Team Valuations, FORBES (Mar. 23,
2016), www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2016/03/23/forbes-releases-19th-annualmlb-team-valuations/#19d736fe57c2 [hereinafter “Forbes Valuation”].
140. See id. (providing examples of individual team growth after receiving
broadcasting deals: The Houston Astros increased 38% in value, the St. Louis
Cardinals increased 14% in value, and the Arizona Diamondbacks increased
10% in value).
141. Id.; Brown, supra note 136.
142. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1071; see also Brown, supra note 136 (showing
the gradual increase in MLB revenue); see also Forbes Valuation, supra note
139 (showing significant increase in individual organization revenue, especially
after receiving broadcasting deals).
143. See generally Carney, supra note 65, at 306-8 (discussing the potential
impact of MLB’s upcoming litigation in the Senne case and recommending
settling to avoid potential public disapproval of how the MiLB players are
compensated if their status receives increased publicity).
144. Carney, supra note 65, at 307; see generally Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 139
(opining that if the Cincinnati Reds satisfied the average receipts then they
would qualify for the section 213(a)(3)(B) FLSA exemption); see also Adams, 155
F.3d at 180 (holding that the Detroit Tigers had proved that their average
receipts for six months were not more than one-third of the rest of the year, and
were therefore entitled to the section 213(a)(3)(B) exemption).
145. Carney, supra note 65, at 306; see also 29 U.S.C. §213 (a)(1), (3)
(providing employers with the creative professional exemption and the seasonal
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MLB’s argument in favor of receiving the benefit of each exemption
for these circumstances.146
1. Creative Professional Analysis
As described earlier in this comment, the creative professional
exemption is evaluated on a three-part test: 1) the employee is paid
on a salary basis; 2) the salary is at least above $455 per week; and
3) the primary duty of the employee involves duties that require
originality or talent in a recognized field or creative endeavor.147
MLB will have no issue passing the first prong of the test, but
faces issues satisfying the remaining two prongs.148 When a player
is drafted to an organization, they typically sign a multiyear
contract earning a regular salary, thus satisfying the salary
requirement.149 Moving on to the second prong of the test, each
players’ salary differs, depending on the league within MiLB the
player is currently assigned.150 The different leagues in MiLB span
from Rookie Ball, where most players start their career, to Triple A,
which is the highest league in the minor league system.151 The
typical salary at Triple A is $2,150 per month, which when broken
down is $537.50 per week.152 This surpasses the $455 threshold.
However, the typical Rookie Ball salary, $1,150 per month, is
$287.50 per week, failing to surpass the $455 threshold.153 Thus,
since some levels of minor league baseball meet the salary test and
some do not, it would depend on what salary level the Court bases
their analysis to determine if MLB satisfies the salary amount

employee exemption).
146. See Department of Labor, supra note 73 (explaining that an employer
is entitled to the creative professional exemption if the employer is paid a salary
of at least $455 per week, and primary duties require originality or talent in a
recognized creative field); see also Adams, 155 F. Supp. at 180 (granting the
Detroit Tigers the seasonal employee exemption because they satisfied the
average receipts test); see also Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596 (granting the Sarasota
White Sox, an MiLB organization, the seasonal employee exemption because
they operated for less than seven months of the year).
147. Department of Labor, supra note 73.
148. Contra Carney, supra note 65, at 297 (arguing that MLB would not be
able to satisfy the salary test of the creative professional exemption because
MiLB players are not compensated for offseason work); but see YOU GO PRO
BASEBALL,
www.yougoprobaseball.com/how-much-money-do-minor-leaguebaseball-players-make-get-paid.html (last visited: Oct. 25, 2016) (explaining an
MiLB player signs a standard 7 year minor league contract that pays between
$1,150 to $2,700 per year, depending on the years of experience and the level
which the player reaches).
149. See generally YOU GO PRO BASEBALL, supra note 148 (describing the
terms of a MiLB players’ original contract).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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prong.154
However, the largest hurdle for MLB to clear when seeking the
creative professional exemption is the final prong, the duties test.155
The Department of Labor has declared that the employee’s primary
duty must require work of originality or talent in a recognized
artistic or creative endeavor.156 For example, artists and musicians
have primary duties in the creative endeavors of art and music.157
Unlike the seasonal employee exemption, MLB has not attempted
to receive the creative professional exemption in the past so it is
unclear if the courts will decide baseball players satisfy the duties
requirement.158 It surely does take a certain level of specialized
talent to play professional baseball.159 However, the creative
professional exemption has typically only been granted to
professions related to performance arts, so MLB would be forced to
make a novel argument.160 The seasonal employee exemption is a
stronger argument MLB can pursue to try to invalidate MiLB
players’ FLSA claims.
2. Seasonal Employee Exemption Analysis
The second FLSA exemption MLB will likely utilize to get the
Senne case dismissed is the seasonal employee exemption.161 This
exemption applies if an employer is a recreational establishment
and can satisfy one of two tests: 1) they operate for less than seven
months of the year, or 2) their average receipts for any six-month
span are not more than one-third of the average receipts for the rest
of the year.162 The three decisions discussed above, Bridewell,
Adams, and Jeffery focused on MLB’s seasonal employee exemption.
The MiLB plaintiffs have the support of the Bridewell and
Adams decisions in their arsenal to counter MLB’s argument for the

154. Id.
155. See generally Department of Labor, supra note 73 (requiring that a
creative professional perform duties that require originality or talent in a
recognized creative field).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Cf. Carney, supra note 65, at 301-6 (describing precedent supporting
the seasonal employee exemption for MLB, while only providing an analysis of
the tests courts should use for the creative professional exemption).
159. See Ian Gordon, Minor League Baseball Players Make Poverty-Level
Wages, www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/baseball-broshuis-minorleague-wage-income (last visited: Oct. 29, 2016) (providing statistics on Minor
League Players’ wages, including the fact that approximately 10% of MiLB
players reach the increased wages of Major League players).
160. Department of Labor, supra note 73.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3); see also Carney, supra note 65, at 301 (stating
that an employer may be granted the seasonal employee exemption if they
either operate for less than seven months per year, or if they satisfy the average
receipts test).
162. Carney, supra note 65, at 301.
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exemption under Section 213(a)(3)(A), the seven-month duration
test.163 It should be noted that in Bridewell the court explicitly
rejected MLB’s contention that their business lasted for less than
seven months per year due to the number of year-round employees
within the organization.164 In Adams, the court agreed with that
decision but granted an exemption under Section 213(a)(3)(B)—the
average receipts test.165 However, the third decision in the triad of
cases discussed above, Jeffery, works against the MiLB plaintiffs,
and may be used for its persuasive authority.166

C. Application of FLSA Case Law to the Senne Complaint
In Jeffery, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with a complaint by
a groundskeeper for the Sarasota White Sox, a MiLB organization
of the Chicago White Sox, alleging FLSA violations.167 The court
granted summary judgment to the organization in part, because
their operations did not last for more than seven months.168
Moreover, the court diverged from the Bridewell and Adams
decisions by ruling that the fact that the plaintiff was employed by
the Sarasota White Sox in the offseason did not alter MLB’s
entitlement to the seasonal employee exemption under section
213(a)(3)(A).169 The court did not elaborate on this stark difference
from Bridewell and Adams; which both held that MLB
organizations’ year-round employment precluded them from
arguing they were only a seven-month organization.170 Thus, the
differing opinions appear to be a circuit split based on how many
year-round employees disqualify an organization from using the
seven-month duration test.171
Why did the Jeffery court differ so strongly from the other
decisions with similar facts? The court reasoned that, “it is the
revenue-producing operation of the Sarasota White Sox as a
professional baseball franchise which affords it the protection of the

163. Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180; see also Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829
(approving of the district court’s analysis that the Cincinnati Reds are only
barred from using the seasonal employee exemption because they did not satisfy
the average receipts test).
164. Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829.
165. Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180.
166. Compare Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593 (holding that a minor league
organization operates for less than seven months and is entitled to the seasonal
employee exemption under section 213(a)(3)(A) with Senne Complaint, supra
note 4 (alleging MLB is violating the FLSA because MiLB players are not paid
the federal minimum wage).
167. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 592-93.
168. Id. at 596.
169. Id.
170. Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 139; Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180.
171. Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 139; Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180; Jeffery, 64 F.3d
at 596.
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exemption.”172 This conclusion can arguably be reconciled with
Bridewell and Adams.173 The Jeffery court cited to Bridewell when
stating that it is the revenue-generating period of the organization
that entitles it to the seasonal employee exemption.174 It appears
that all three cases focus on the revenue generated from the
operation, but the Jeffery court did not believe there were enough
year-round employees to disqualify the organization from the
seasonal employee exemption.175
1. How the Senne Plaintiffs Can Distinguish Themselves
from Jeffery
The plaintiffs in the Senne lawsuit will benefit from aligning
themselves as close as possible with the plaintiffs in Bridewell and
Adams to defeat MLB’s argument for a section 213(a)(3)(A)
exemption.176 Both decisions indicate that an MLB franchise may
not avail itself of the 213(a)(3)(A) exemption because they are yearround operations due to the amount of employees that are employed
on a full-time basis.177
Contrary to Jeffery, the plaintiffs in Senne filed their complaint
against all MLB teams and its Commissioner, rather than against
individual MiLB organizations.178 The two cases, Bridewell and
Adams, that dealt with MLB organizations held that the
organizations had too many year-round employees to be “seasonal”;
whereas the MiLB organization in Jeffery presumably did not suffer
from that same limitation.179 It is also important to stress that each
of these three cases did not deal with players within the
organization, rather the past complaints were brought by support
staff members, specifically, groundskeepers, batboys, and general
maintenance staff members.180 Therefore, it is unknown how a court
will decide a case with actual players as the complainant.
172. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596.
173. Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829; Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180.
174. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596.
175. Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829; Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180; see also Jeffery,
64 F.3d at 596 (reasoning that the organization is not required to terminate
every employee to receive the seasonal employee exemption).
176. Id.
177. Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829; see also Adams, 961 F. Supp at 180
(agreeing with the Bridewell court insofar that a MLB organization is a yearround operation because they employ a significant amount of year-round
employees).
178. Senne Complaint, supra note 4.
179. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596.
180. See Jeffery, 64 F.3d 590 (alleging FLSA violations by failing to pay a
MiLB organization’s groundskeeper minimum wage); see also Bridewell, 155
F.3d 828 (alleging FLSA violations by failing to pay the MLB organizations’
maintenance workers minimum wage); see also Adams, 961 F. Supp. 176
(alleging FLSA violations by failing to pay the MLB organizations’ batboys a
minimum wage).
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Even if the plaintiffs in Senne can distinguish themselves from
Jeffery, they still face the hurdle of arguing against the section
213(a)(3)(B) test, otherwise known as the average receipts test.181 If
an employer’s average receipts for any given six-month period are
not more than one-third of the rest of the year, they are entitled to
the seasonal employee exemption.182 The Bridewell court
determined the Reds did not satisfy this test because of their
accounting method, but the Adams court granted the Detroit Tigers
an exemption, holding that the organization used the proper
accounting method to show they passed the average receipts test.183
Thus, it appears that under Bridewell and Adams, if MLB can
satisfy the average receipts test similar to the defendant franchise
in Adams, it will likely qualify for the seasonal employee
exemption.184 If MLB can satisfy the average receipts test it may be
useful for MiLB to argue from a policy perspective, that it is unfair
to treat MiLB players similar to employees who typically work for a
seasonal operation.185 The basis for this policy argument is outlined
below.
a. Rationale of the seasonal employee exemption in general
Particular portions of the legislative history of the seasonal
employee exemption indicate Congress was concerned with how
requiring a minimum wage would affect student workers186. During
debates in the Senate, various Senators commented that exempting
these seasonal student workers would preserve their jobs.187
Congress justified not requiring minimum wages for student
workers because they could afford to earn lower wages due to their
dependent status on their parents.188 In Brennan v. Yellowstone, the
court opined that this legislative history might indicate that the
seasonal employee exemption was in fact, designed for student
workers.189
181. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(B).
182. Id.
183. Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829; Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180.
184. See Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 178 (stating that the Tigers accountant’s
figures were unchallenged and they showed that they were less than one-third
of their average receipts for the rest of the year).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(B); see generally Department of Labor: Wage and
Hour
Division
(2008),
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs18.pdf
(promulgating guidelines on how to classify employers who qualify for the
seasonal employee exemption).
186. Charlotte S. Alexander & Nathaniel Grow, Article, Gaming the System:
The Exemption of Professional Sports Teams from the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 137 (2015).
187. See id. (expounding on the reasoning for exempting student workers
from the FLSA; out of fear that requiring student workers be paid minimum
wage would result in elimination of a number of jobs held by students).
188. Id.
189. See Brennan v. Yellowstone, 478 F.2d 285, 288-89 (10th Cir. 1973)
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How the Senne plaintiffs can apply this policy argument

The Senne plaintiffs may argue that it is unfair to hold them
to this exemption. They can cite to their independent status with
many players supporting families, the fact that this is a career for
them rather than a part-time job, and the amount of time they must
put into being successful at their craft.190 All of these factors are not
involved in the employment of student workers.191 Granted, the
actual season for MiLB players coincides with the length of the MLB
season, ranging from March to October, however, players must
train year-round to improve their abilities.192 Moreover, these minor
league players also have bills to pay, families to support, and
typically must work multiple jobs in the offseason, like delivering
pizzas and carpentry side jobs.193
These are issues not present with student employees at typical
recreational establishments addressed by the Brennan court.194 Not
to mention, some minor leaguers are required to attend certain
team events during the offseason; for example, some Chicago Cubs
minor leaguers attend the Cubs fan convention every winter.195
Ultimately, MiLB plaintiffs must argue that the Tenth Circuit’s
opinion of the intent of the Section 213(a)(3) is correct, and it is
inherently unfair to hold them to the same standard as student
workers.196
However, this is a difficult argument for MiLB to make given
the strict construction courts have given the FLSA exemptions.197 It
(discussing the possible intent of the seasonal employee exemption being
limited to student employees since they often worked summer recreational jobs,
which required less protection).
190. Brennan, 478 F.2d at 288-89.
191. Alexander & Grow, supra note 186, at 137.
192. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, www.mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/
index.jsp#date=10/02/2016 (last visited: Oct. 26, 2016).
193. See Zack Meiesel, Many Minor Leaguers Work Second, Third, or Fourth
Jobs During the Offseason, So When Do They Find Time to Train?
www.cleveland.com/tribe/index.ssf/2016/02/many_minor_leaguers_work_secon
.html (last visited: Oct. 29, 2016) (illustrating MiLB players’ necessity to work
multiple jobs while training for their season at the same time during the
offseason).
194. Cf. Brennan, 478 F.2d at 288-89 (opining on the intent behind the
seasonal employee exemption in a case involving hotel student employees at
Yellowstone National Park).
195. See CHICAGO CUBS ONLINE, chicagocubsonline.com/archives/2016/01/
31st-cubs-convention-schedule-and-list-of-attendees.php (last visited: Oct. 28,
2016) (providing list of players on the Chicago Cubs required to attend their fan
convention in January, which in this case included minor leaguers such as Dan
Vogelbach, Zac Rosscup, and Pierce Johnson among others).
196. Brennan, 478 F.2d at 288-89.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 213; see also Brennan, 478 F.2d at 289 (declining to accept
an employer’s argument because it ran contrary to accepted rules of
construction which require a narrow construction of exemptions).
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is well settled that the exemptions for the FLSA are to be strictly
construed and the employer need only prove that the employee falls
within the language of the exemption.198 Thus, the Senne plaintiffs
may fail in defeating either FLSA exception, and the best remaining
avenue for change would be through legislation.199

D. Is it Plausible to Replicate the CFA in a Beneficial Way
to MiLB Players?
Prior to determining if it is plausible for Congress to replicate
the CFA in a beneficial way for MiLB players, it is necessary to
understand the circumstances leading to the passage of the CFA.200
The CFA was passed in response to the lawsuit filed by Curt Flood,
who believed the reserve clause, which restricted a player’s freedom
to determine what team he would play for, was unjust and unfair.201
The reserve clause gave an organization perpetual control over any
given players’ contract, including their salary.202 The CFA for all
intents and purposes eliminated the reserve clause for MLB
players, but did nothing to improve the situation for MiLB
players.203
1. Does the Same Unfairness Which Was Present Prior to
Passage of the CFA Still Exist for MiLB Players?
Prior to the CFA, all players were subject to the reserve clause
in their contracts, giving the MLB organization sole discretion over
players’ rights.204 MLB players were determined to remove the
reserve clause, in part, because they can earn higher salaries if they
are able to enter a free market.205 The CFA, in conjunction with
developments in contract arbitration, essentially eradicated the use
of the reserve clause, since its ability to perpetually control a
player’s salary tended to operate as a monopolistic device.206

198. Brennan, 478 F.2d at 289.
199. See generally id; see also Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 180 (granting MLB
the seasonal employee exemption under Section 213(a)(3)(B), hindering MiLB’s
argument against MLB’s entitlement to being exempt from the FLSA).
200. See generally Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068-70 (discussing generally the
purpose of the CFA and the differing opinions of how it should be interpreted).
201. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1067; see also Carney, supra note 65, at 286-87
(describing the reserve clause as a tool for MLB organizations in the past to
perpetually tie players to an organization, giving the owners permanent
unilateral control over contracts).
202. Carney, supra note 65, at 286-87.
203. See FANGRAPHS, supra note 102 (describing service time requirements,
which require six years of major league experience before a minor league player
reaches free agency and can receive a new contract).
204. Carney, supra note 65, at 286.
205. Id. at 287.
206. Id.
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Moreover, the CFA gave MLB players standing to sue the owners
for antitrust violations, and the reserve clause has since been
abandoned for contracts based on service time.207 Players are now
granted free agency after six years of MLB service time.208 This
service time requirement is nearly identical to the reserve clause as
applied to minor leaguers since a majority of them never get the
chance to surpass that six-year threshold.209
MiLB players are subject to the same six-year restriction
before they are able to seek a new contract.210 This restriction
essentially functions in the same manner as the reserve clause,
insofar as it tends to perpetually tie a player to an organization. A
majority of players do not end up making a major league roster
(approximately 10% of all minor leaguers make it to the MLB).211
Therefore, MiLB players are forced to deal with at least six years of
no bargaining power and no control over where they play baseball.
212 Such circumstances are starkly similar to those faced by Major
League players prior to Flood, and the CFA.213 One theory to fix this
issue is to interpret the CFA in a manner that includes MiLB
players. However, that proposal has faced push back because of the
textual interpretations described earlier in this comment.
2. Should the CFA Encompass MiLB Players’ Claims of
Antitrust Violations?
This issue lacks precedent, but that has not stopped arguments
for a broad interpretation of the CFA to include MiLB athletes.214
Supporters of this view argue that the CFA is intended to apply to
all aspects of professional major league baseball, including MiLB
contracts.215 However, a closer look at the CFA shows that, although
no court has spoken on its interpretation, the CFA was likely not
intended to include MiLB.216
The CFA qualifies baseball players entitled to antitrust
protection with the phrase “major league” three separate times in

207. Id. at 286-87.
208. FANGRAPHS, supra note 102.
209. See Gordon, supra note 159 (providing data that shows approximately
10% of those who play in MiLB ever reach MLB).
210. FANGRAPHS, supra note 102.
211. See Gordon, supra note 159 (providing statistics on Minor League
Players’ wages, including the fact that approximately 10% of MiLB players
reach the increased wages of Major League players).
212. FANGRAPHS, supra note 102; see also Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068-70
(discussing the events and circumstances that led to the passage of the Curt
Flood Act).
213. Id.
214. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068-69 (describing Miranda, a pending
lawsuit arguing uniform player contracts should be subject to the CFA)
215. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1068.
216. Id.
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the statute.217 First, “it is the purpose of this legislation to state that
major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust
laws…”218 Next, it states that, “…the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements of persons in the business of organized professional
major league baseball…are subject to the antitrust laws…”219
Finally, the statute limits who has standing to bring suit under the
CFA to only major league baseball players.220 Thus, even though
MiLB players can argue for a broad interpretation of the CFA, the
language of the CFA significantly hinders that argument.221
3. The Current Status of MiLB Players Requires Legislation
in Their Favor.
MiLB players’ situation has hit a point where they are finally
taking a stand and fighting for their protection, evidenced by the
Senne lawsuit.222 It is important to note that the court in Flood
recognized that MLB’s antitrust exemption was an anomaly, but
was hesitant to disrupt precedent.223 Instead, they deferred to
Congress stating that if there was to be a change it would need to
come from Congress, with the result being the CFA.224 It is plausible
that the court which decides Senne may be sympathetic to the MiLB
plaintiff’s circumstances. However, it may still be forced either to
recognize MLB’s FLSA exemption due to the statute’s strict
construction, or defer to Congress.225
The next step for MiLB in this event would be to lobby
Congress to take action to protect their interests, similar to what
occurred after Flood.226 Former MiLB players have been actively
217. The Curt Flood Act §§ 2-(3)(a), (3)(c).
218. The Curt Flood Act § 2.
219. The Curt Flood Act § 3(a).
220. The Curt Flood Act § 3(c).
221. The Curt Flood Act § 3; see also Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1069-73
(describing the support for a narrow interpretation of the CFA as well as
arguing that MLB’s funding of MiLB and the amount of players MiLB can
support can only be retained through a narrow interpretation).
222. See generally Senne Complaint, supra note 4 (alleging all MLB
organizations and the Commissioner of MLB of violating the FLSA in their
failure to pay MiLB athletes, as a class, a federal minimum wage).
223. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 284 (agreeing that the antitrust exemption MLB
enjoys is in fact an anomaly, but ultimately deciding that Congress is the body
of government that has the right to change that fact, and the Court must adhere
to precedent).
224. Id.
225. See generally id. (granting deference to Congress and showing
hesitance to disrupt longstanding antitrust precedent regarding MLB’s
exemption); see also Brennan, 478 F.2d at 289 (explaining that exemption
provisions of the FLSA are to be construed strictly).
226. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1067-68 (explaining that the CFA was
passed 26 years after Flood, and after MLB and its players agreed to lobby to
Congress to pass a law that would ensure the players are protected by antitrust
laws).
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speaking out in efforts to paint the bleak picture that is the wage
status of current MiLB athletes.227 MiLB’s best chance to succeed
in guaranteeing a minimum wage is through legislation.228 They
can do this by arguing against the inherent unfairness of their
current wage status, and by tying themselves as closely with the
circumstances that led to the passage of the CFA as possible.229

V.

PROPOSAL

This comment concludes by proposing a novel solution.
Drafting new legislation modeled after the CFA to protect minor
league players. First, this proposal discusses solutions offered by
other commentators and explains why these solutions have
potential, but ultimately fall short.230 Next, this proposal explains
the logistics of legislation which would protect MiLB, while
borrowing language from the CFA. Contrary to the CFA, the focus
of legislation protecting MiLB players would be entitling them to
the benefits of the FLSA, rather than antitrust laws.231 Finally, this
comment also proposes that a reporting and disclosure system be
implemented to guarantee MLB compliance with the proposed
legislation.

A. Why Other Proposals Are Insufficient to Protect MiLB
Players
Multiple commentators have proposed giving MiLB players the
right to collectively negotiate for their rights.232 A MiLB union does
have its benefits, since increased numbers generally provides

227. See generally Fagan, supra note 125 (describing the Save the Pastime
Act’s purpose of guaranteeing MiLB players would not be protected by the FLSA
is outrageous); see also DiGiovanni, supra note 20, at 259-60 (advocating for
MiLB players to unionize, but at the same time recognizing that it took nearly
80 years for MLB players to form a union).
228. See Carney, supra note 65, at 286-88 (describing the situation MLB
players faced prior to Congress passing the CFA. This can be compared to MiLB
players’ current situation)
229. See generally id. (describing the reserve clause which was in place prior
to the CFA being passed, which MiLB can compare to the service time
requirements before they can reach free agency); see also Gordon, supra note
159 (describing the circumstances regarding MiLB players’ wages, including the
fact that MLB salaries have increased 2,500% since 1976 while MiLB salaries
have increased 70%).
230. See Carney, supra note 65, at 310-11 (proposing minor league players
unionize to negotiate labor issues with MLB).
231. The Curt Flood Act § 2 (protecting MLB players from antitrust
violations,
232. Carney, supra note 65, at 310-11; see also DiGiovanni, supra note 20,
at 259-60 (arguing that even though unionization of MiLB players seems
unlikely, it would be the best solution for MiLB to protect their interests).
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increased power in negotiating.233 The Major League Player’s
Association (“MLBPA”) was instrumental in the drafting of the
CFA, however, the current MLBPA is not legally required to protect
MiLB interests.234 The drawbacks to proposing unionization as a
solution are uncertainty and the length of time it would take to
implement. One commentator’s proposal of unionization is
premised on MLB settling with MiLB in Senne.235 Settlement in
Senne is far from certain, given the potential FLSA defense of
MLB.236
Moreover, assuming arguendo that MLB does ultimately settle
with Senne, the eventual unionization of MiLB players would take
too long to adequately protect today’s MiLB players. Proponents of
this solution recognize this drawback, admitting that the MLBPA
took over eighty years to successfully unionize.237 MiLB is much
more diverse than MLB due to MiLB having more teams and
players.238 Thus, it would likely be as hard, if not more difficult for
MiLB to unionize as it was for MLB. Furthermore, even if MiLB
were to successfully unionize, it would not be completed for an
extended period of years, leaving MiLB players still unprotected for
an indefinite amount time.

B. Congress Can Use the CFA for Guidance When
Drafting Legislation to Protect MiLB Players
Congress can go in two separate directions if they choose to
protect MiLB wage status. They can choose to amend the current
CFA and grant minor league players the right to sue in Section 3(c).
Alternatively, they could draft a stand-alone statute that applies
strictly to MiLB players. Congress would be better suited to choose
the latter option. As discussed earlier in this comment, the interests
of MiLB and MLB players differ greatly, due in large part to the
increased number of MiLB players.239 Drafting a separate statute
233. See DiGiovanni, supra note 20, at 259-60 (explaining that the MLBPA
has no legal obligation to protect MiLB players, and that the two groups
interests differ to the point where the MLBPA would nonetheless be insufficient
to protect MiLB interests).
234. Id.
235. Carney, supra note 65, at 310.
236. Carney, supra note 65, at 306-07; see also Adams, 961 F. Supp. at 178
(stating that the Tigers accountant’s figures were unchallenged and they
showed that they were less than one-third of their average receipts for the rest
of the year, thus entitling them to the seasonal employee exemption).
237. DiGiovanni, supra note 20, at 260.
238. See Nocco, supra note 2 (citing MLB’s statement in support of the ‘Save
the Pastime Act’ where MLB argues that they cannot afford raises due to the
7,500 players. On the other hand, MLB only has 30 teams with 25 men rosters,
which would total only 750 players).
239. See id. (explaining the significant difference in number of MiLB players
compared to MLB players (7,500 in MiLB compared to approximately 750 in
MLB)).
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for MiLB players, while looking to the CFA for guidance provides
for more flexibility if future changes are necessary.
Also, it is important to remember that the CFA protected major
league players from antitrust violations, as shown by its stated
purpose.240 It is more appropriate for Congress to protect MiLB
players from FLSA violations, rather than antitrust violations.
Protection under FLSA rather than antitrust is more appropriate
because of the troublesome history of MiLB and MLB regarding the
former’s wages.241 Antitrust protections are certainly desirable, but
would likely require significantly longer to establish sound policy,
due to MLB’s desire to retain as much control over players as
possible.242 Achieving protection from antitrust laws is also difficult
to accomplish considering how careful the Court has been in
refusing to alter MLB’s antitrust exemption in any fashion.243
Providing MiLB players FLSA protection can be done much quicker,
and will significantly improve the working conditions of MiLB
players.244
1. Structure of Legislation Protecting MiLB Players
Certain provisions of new protective legislation can borrow
from the CFA in various respects. First, the purpose of the new act
would be to declare that minor league baseball players are not
subject to the exemptions of the FLSA. Note, this is essentially the
opposite of the ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’, which proposes that
MiLB players are expressly exempted from the FLSA
exemptions.245 Congress can support this endeavor by showing
evidence of the low wages earned by MiLB players coupled with the
wealth of MLB organizations discussed above.246
As for the substance of the act, Congress can borrow from the

240. The Curt Flood Act § 2.
241. See Stanton, supra note 105, at 744-45 (explaining that the 2012 Basic
Agreement limited minor league player’s earning potential and bargaining
power before they play in the minor leagues).
242. See generally Hobbs, supra note 7, at 1066-67 (describing the history of
the development of the CFA, specifically that there was 26 years in between the
decision in Flood and Congress finally passing the CFA); see also Alexander &
Grow, supra note 183, at 176 (quoting a former Congressman as once stating
that the professional baseball lobby is, “…as great a lobby that descended upon
the House…” that he saw in 35 years of experience).
243. See generally Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (deferring to Congressional
inaction and declining to alter MLB’s exemption from antitrust laws; see also
Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (acknowledging that MLB’s treatment under antitrust
law is an anomaly but once again declining to alter it due to Congressional
inaction).
244. See Gordon, supra note 159 (providing statistics on the disparity
between MiLB and MLB salaries).
245. 114 H.R. 5580 § 2.
246. Gordon, supra note 159; Brown, supra note 136; Forbes Valuation,
supra note 139.
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CFA again, but declare that any conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements between organizations in MLB, MiLB, and MiLB
players are now subject to the FLSA minimum wage
requirement.247 Thus, MLB would be required by law to pay their
MiLB players at least the federally minimum wage, and they may
not seek to avoid doing so by justifying such action through FLSA
exemptions. This proposal begs the question of what constitutes an
hour of work for a MiLB player. For the purposes of this proposal,
an hour of work should be considered the time a MiLB player spends
doing mandatory or team sponsored activities. This encompasses
the long hours players spend at facilities prior to games (batting
practice, fielding drills, etc.) and the games themselves.248
Moreover, team sponsored activities would compensate players for
particular off-season programs they are required to attend.
However, this proposal, as described, does not provide recourse if
an MLB organization fails to follow it. Once again, Congress can
borrow from the CFA to resolve this issue.
The new act should include a provision defining who can
challenge a violation of the substantive provision. The best way to
accomplish this is to provide standing to sue under the act to: 1) any
individual who has signed a MiLB or MLB contract, 2) and is
currently signed and on the roster of a MiLB organization.249 The
standing to sue can also be limited by excluding players who are
currently playing for a MLB organization.
2. Secondary Proposal to Guarantee Protection of MiLB
Players
Legislation prohibiting unfair wages is an important solution
to the plight of MiLB players, but Congress must be mindful of
supplementary ways to enforce it. The threat of individual players
bringing lawsuits may not be sufficient to deter MLB organizations
from violating the legislation. One must keep in mind the
heightened revenues MLB organizations continue to gross, and
contrast that with the low wages of the average MiLB player.250
Therefore, it is not out of the realm of possibility that an MLB
organization choose not to abide by the Act and risk a lawsuit,
believing they can absorb the losses of any suit. One way to
counteract this possibility is to institute a disclosure and
247. See The Curt Flood Act § 3(a) (declaring that the conducts, acts,
practices and agreements of persons in professional major league baseball are
subject to the antitrust laws).
248. See Senne Complaint, supra note 4 (explaining that the players often
spend at approximately eight hours per day at stadiums for mandatory
activities).
249. The Curt Flood Act § 3(c).
250. Forbes Valuation, supra note 139; Gordon, supra note 159; see also
Blank, supra note 100 (providing the typical monthly salaries of minor league
players).
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monitoring system.
The disclosure and monitoring system can be operated by the
Department of Labor to ensure that MLB is abiding by the statute.
MLB would be required to file a copy of each MiLB players contract
with the Department of Labor so that each player’s salary is known.
This allows the Department to monitor MLB’s payment of its MiLB
players, to ensure they are not violating the FLSA and the new
proposed Act. By implementing a disclosure and monitoring system,
MLB will have less incentive to violate the Acts. Without the
disclosure requirement, there would be a loophole in the Act capable
of exploitation. MLB could either take the chance of being sued and
pay damages or drag out a lawsuit filed by a MiLB player. In the
latter, the case can be delayed to the point where the possible
damages won are insufficient to outweigh litigation costs.
Opponents of this proposal are sure to be numerous and
powerful. Commentators have noted that the professional baseball
lobby is among the most powerful in existence, a fact that was
exemplified by their ability to pass the original CFA.251 They would
likely be against this type of proposed legislation, especially
considering MLB’s statement in support of the ‘Save the Pastime
Act’.252 However, as a matter of fairness and good public policy, it is
time for Congress to stand against the self-interested wealthy MLB,
and repair the distressing wage situation that is unique to minor
league baseball players.

VI. CONCLUSION
MLB has benefited from favorable treatment by the courts and
Congress regarding antitrust and FLSA laws for nearly a century.
It is evident even from the Court’s own statements in Toolson and
Flood that MLB’s exemption from antitrust laws is an anomaly
which does not exist elsewhere.253 Congress finally stepped up to
the plate and protected major leaguers from antitrust violations by
passing the CFA, but injustices still persist for the MiLB players
who dream of one day making it to MLB. MiLB players’ wages are
below the minimum wage. This is inherently unfair considering the
251. See Alexander & Grow, supra note 186, at 173 (discussing a former
congressman’s comments about the professional baseball lobby being one of the
most powerful ever to come to Washington D.C.)
252. See Nocco, supra note 2 (publishing MLB’s statement in support of the
‘Save the Pastime Act’, citing concerns that they would not be able to afford
paying the raised wages of MiLB players).
253. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (granting deference to congressional
inaction, regarding MLB’s antitrust exemption, “We think that if there are evils
in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should
be by legislation”); see also Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (acknowledging baseball’s
anomaly in the field of antitrust law, “With its reserve system enjoying
exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense,
an exception and an anomaly”).
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amount of time and practice they must put into their craft.254 To
continue to subject them to FLSA exemptions would allow MLB,
who can certainly afford the raise in wages, to continue to prosper
off their work through MiLB revenues.
Unionization of MiLB, if ever successful, would undoubtedly
take an unreasonable amount of years. Therefore, the best
opportunity to improve MiLB players’ situation is for Congress to
draft legislation to protect them from FLSA violations. MLB’s
arguments for the opposite are misguided. They can afford to pay
MiLB players modest raises to give them fair compensation, as
shown by their progressively increasing net revenues which are not
expected to decline due to the growth of individual organization
broadcast deals.255 These increased revenues contradict MLB’s
argument that they would be forced to decrease MiLB roster sizes
due to an inability to fund increased MiLB wages. It is more likely
that the number of MiLB players would decrease due to the players’
inability to provide for themselves with their low wages.

254. See Berg, supra note 108 (quoting former MiLB player and current
lawyer Garrett Broshious speaking about the amount of work MiLB players put
in, “Guys are frequently working 60 or 70 hours a week, and they’re doing so for
very low wages”).
255. Forbes Valuation, supra note 139.
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